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Abstract: This paper focuses on the decision to go public when both seller and
potential buyers have private beneﬁts of control. The basic model by Zingales (1995)
is extended to account for uncertainty of private beneﬁts. This leads to new impli-
cations for the sales process, ownership structure, measurement of private beneﬁts
and the eﬃciency of takeover regimes. The optimal way to sell the company diﬀers
from the model with perfect information in that the incumbent always choses to go
public instead of selling directly to a potential rival whenever the rival is expected
to increase cash ﬂow but not necessarily total ﬁrm value. IPO price and volume
are lower than under perfect information which induces a socially non-optimal so-
lution in takeover transactions. Imperfect information also explains post-IPO un-
derperformance of ﬁrms which are not subject to control transfers. To compensate
shareholders for potential losses during the sales process, the oﬀering price has to
be lower than under perfect information. This provides the basis for a diﬀerential
stock price performance depending on the buyer taking over or not. Furthermore,
an overestimation bias exists in prior estimates of control premiums, because some
ﬁrms going public are never sold but nevertheless provide private beneﬁts. Finally,
mandatory tender oﬀers in the form of a fair price rule and an equal opportunity
rule are discussed, which indicate that the social superiority of either rule is strongly
dependent on the empirical distribution characteristics of private beneﬁts.
Keywords: initial public oﬀerings (IPOs), corporate control, private beneﬁts, long-
run performance, mandatory bid
JEL classiﬁcation: G14, G32, G34
∗Fachhochschule Stralsund, Germany, email: olaf.ehrhardt@fh-stralsund.de
†Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies, Technische Universit¨ at M¨ unchen, Germany,
email: henry.lahr@cefs.de1 Introduction
The decision to list has been widely studied and several causes to go public have
been identiﬁed, such as need for funding, liquidity beneﬁts, enhanced company im-
age and publicity, improved motivation of management and employees, cashing in
or exploiting mispricings (R¨ oell, 1996). This paper focuses on the corporate control
dimension of initial public oﬀerings (IPOs) within an extended divestiture process
when both buyer and seller have private beneﬁts of control. Several formal mod-
els have been developed to explain why IPOs might be an attractive component of
initial owners’ divestiture eﬀorts. Zingales (1995) suggests that ﬁrms use two-stage
sales to maximize total proceeds by relying on the capital market to auction oﬀ cash
ﬂow rights and the market for corporate control to negotiate the sale of the private
beneﬁts of control. Bebchuk (1999) argues that when private beneﬁts of control are
large, retaining a majority of votes enables initial shareholders to capture a larger
fraction of the surplus from value-producing transfers of control. Therefore, the
probability of controlling shareholder structures, such as dual-class stock, is likely
to increase with higher private beneﬁts. Mello and Parsons (1998) emphasize the
information an owner obtains by going public regarding the value of the ﬁrm, and
Ellingsen and Rydqvist (1997) develop a model focusing on the screening function
of the stock market for ﬁrms undergoing divestiture. At and Morand (2000) de-
velop a model for privatizations of government ﬁrms. They ﬁnd that one share-one
vote structures are optimal for allocating control rights to the most eﬃcient buyer.
However, this structure is not always optimal for maximizing the sale’s revenue.
The model developed in this paper is based on the one by Zingales (1995) and
extends its ﬁndings in several directions. The main contribution of this paper is re-
laxing the assumption that agents have perfect information about the other agents’
types. While many authors concerned with ownership structure (Bebchuk, 1999),
initial public oﬀerings (Stoughton & Zechner, 1998), and the process of divesting the
company (Mello & Parsons, 1998) employ uncertainty of cash ﬂows in their models,
our model is designed to shed some light on the consequences of the rival’s private
beneﬁts of control being unknown at the time of the decision to sell the company.
This introduces a selection process for takeovers which could harm minority share-
holders and in the course of the sales process leads to a second best solution for the
wealth distribution in IPOs and subsequent control transfers.
Since the seminal work by Berle and Means (1932) there has been extensive re-
search on the separation of ownership and control and related agency problems.
Diverging interests due to private information emerge between the incumbent man-
ager of the ﬁrm who wants to divest his ownership stake and dispersed investors who
1want to buy shares of that ﬁrm, because some rival is able to increase cash ﬂow.
Dispersed shareholders only have knowledge about the distribution of the rival’s
private beneﬁts. Therefore, they must base their decision of how many shares to
buy on the incumbent’s strategy for possible outcomes of these private beneﬁts. If
the shareholders’ estimate is too high, the incumbent sells more shares to minority
shareholders as would be possible if a subsequent control sale to the rival was to be
conducted. The incumbent thus retains majority voting power and higher cash ﬂow
is not realized, which leaves shareholders with a loss. To compensate them for losses
on the left tail of the distribution of private beneﬁts, the incumbent has to oﬀer
shares at the IPO for less than she would under perfect information. Consequently,
initial public oﬀerings are priced lower than in Zingales’ model, while the incumbent
retains a larger fraction of the company. This result has implications for ownership
structure and the allocation of cash ﬂow claims and voting rights. The higher pri-
vate beneﬁts, the more likely are dual-class structures with diﬀerential voting rights
(see also Grossman and Hart (1988), Harris and Raviv (1989)).
Another interesting feature of uncertain private beneﬁts comes into play after the
initial public oﬀering. Conditional on the rival realizing suﬃciently high private
beneﬁts and thus acquiring the controlling block, share prices increase when control
sales are announced or decrease as the probability of a control transfer reaches zero.
This explains post-IPO underperformance of stocks which are not subject to control
transfers compared to ﬁrms that are taken over subsequent to their initial public
oﬀering.
This paper endogenously derives a measure for private beneﬁts by estimating
control premiums. Private beneﬁts can hardly be measured directly, since otherwise
they might be claimed in court by minority shareholders. However, four methods
have been suggested to indirectly assess their magnitude. Inferring private beneﬁts
by estimating premiums paid in corporate control transactions (Barclay and Hold-
erness (1989), Dyck and Zingales (2004)) and measuring price diﬀerences between
shares with diﬀerential voting rights (Levy (1982), Zingales (1994), Nenova (2003))
are the most widely used methods. Atanasov (2005) employs an approach using
mass privatization auction data to estimate private beneﬁts, and Barclay, Holder-
ness, and Pontiﬀ (1993) measure the price paid for closed-end funds against their
respective net asset value. Our model provides predictions for control block sales
` a la Barclay and Holderness and identiﬁes a new bias in prior estimates. This bias
results from the fact that ﬁrms with low private beneﬁts sometimes go public but are
never taken over due to adverse selection under imperfect information. Therefore,
substantial private beneﬁts might exist which are never observed, for some control
2blocks do not change hands.
The importance of initial public oﬀerings within a divestiture plan is becomes more
pronounced with uncertain private beneﬁts. Under these more general assumptions,
the decision to list becomes independent from private beneﬁts. This paves the
way for IPOs even if on average the ﬁrm would be less valuable under some rival
taking over subsequent to the IPO. The optimal way to sell the company is to
ﬁrst go public with a minority or non-voting fraction of the company and then
to sell the voting block to some new owner, dependent on the realisation of this
owner’s private beneﬁts. An IPO is always preferable to selling directly to some
new majority shareholder, if this new owner is expected to generate higher cash
ﬂows than the incumbent and the incumbent’s bargaining power is not perfect.
Because in some cases realised private beneﬁts will be large enough to make a sale
viable, uncertainty causes a non-zero probability that the company is sold following
an IPO, which attracts minority shareholders to share in the gains from higher cash
ﬂows and a more valuable ﬁrm. The incumbent thus sells a corresponding fraction
of the company to dispersed shareholders, since she can extract their full utility due
to perfectly competitive markets for dispersed shares, which she could not do when
bargaining directly with the rival.
To explore our model in the light of takeover regulation, mandatory tender oﬀers
by rivals acquiring control are introduced in the basic model and in the model with
uncertain private beneﬁts.
First, the rival is required to pay a fair price to minority shareholders, measured
by some average past share price. Under perfect information as in the basic model,
there is a set of possible combinations of IPO price and fraction of the company
retained by the incumbent which maximize the incumbent’s revenue by extracting
the rival’s entire surplus. Mandatory bids under uncertain private beneﬁts, however,
have no eﬀect on revenues accruing to incumbent or rival compared to our model
without such regulations. The incumbent is not able to exploit mandatory bids by
extracting the rival’s surplus because this would involve setting an IPO price higher
than the equilibrium price without mandatory bids, which in turn would only be
possible if shareholders receive a compensation for their risk of having paid too much.
By oﬀering a consideration that is higher than the IPO price, mandatory bids could
force the rival to provide this compensation. If this consideration is measured by
an average share price, however, shareholders would have to bid up the price to the
optimal level. This is impossible if the market for dispersed shares is competitive,
because the last buyers in the market would suﬀer a loss in the moment the rival
makes an oﬀer, since they would always have bid more than the average price.
3Second, mandatory bids are combined with an equal opportunity which stipulates
that minority shareholders receive the same per-share price as the incumbent in case
of a control transfer. Results for a model with perfect information are the same as
described before, since there is no diﬀerence between a fair price rule and an equal
opportunity, because the IPO price is the same as the per-share price paid whenever
control is transferred. Adding this same-price rule to our model with uncertain
private beneﬁts yields new insights into the social eﬃciency of either rule. Before
deciding how to sell the company, the incumbent anticipates all wealth eﬀects, which
makes this model behave very much like a model without takeover regulation. Small
diﬀerences in optimal IPO price and fraction depending on the empirical distribution
of private beneﬁts lead to a change in the probability of control transfers, which in
turn determines the optimality of takeover regulation.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a more detailed discussion on
private beneﬁts of control, their origins, and methods to measure them. Section 3
describes Zingales’ model with perfect information. The assumption of perfect in-
formation is relaxed in section 4, which outlines our general model. Implications for
the allocation of voting rights, post-IPO share price performance, control premiums,
the optimal way to divest the company, and takeover regimes are derived in section
4.
2 Private Beneﬁts
Studies concerning the eﬀects of block ownership on corporate decisions, including
E. H. Fama and Jensen (1983), DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985), Demsetz and Lehn
(1985), and Stulz (1988), suggest that managers who own large blocks of stock
receive corporate beneﬁts disproportionate to their fractional ownership. Jensen
and Meckling (1976) point out that
These decisions will involve not only the beneﬁts [the manager] derives from
pecuniary returns but also the utility generated by various non-pecuniary
aspects of his entrepreneurial activities such as the physical appointments
of the oﬃce, the attractiveness of the secretarial staﬀ, the level of employee
discipline, the kind and amount of charitable contributions, personal relations
(“love”, “respect”, etc.) with employees, a larger than optimal computer to
play with, purchase of production inputs from friends, etc.
They stress that agency problems arise from the separation of ownership and
control such that if the owner-manager sells equity claims on the corporation which
4are identical to his, agency costs will be generated by the divergence between his
interests and those of the outside shareholders. This is because he will bear only
a fraction of the costs of any non-pecuniary beneﬁts he takes out to maximize his
own utility. Coﬀee (2001) deﬁnes private beneﬁts of control as “all the ways in
which those in control of a corporation can siphon oﬀ beneﬁts to themselves that
are not shared by the other shareholders”. Grossman and Hart (1988) distinguish
private beneﬁts and security beneﬁts in control contests: “The private beneﬁts of
control are the beneﬁts current management of the acquiror obtains for themselves,
but that the target securityholders do not obtain” while the “security beneﬁts refer
to the total market value of the income streams that accrue to the corporation’s
securityholders.” The common feature of all diﬀerent kinds of private beneﬁts is
that “some value, whatever the source, is not shared among all the shareholders in
proportion of the shares owned, but it is enjoyed exclusively by the party in control”,
as Dyck and Zingales (2004) point out. This is the case if a controlling party can
appropriate value for himself only when this value is not veriﬁable (i.e., provable in
court).
While Jensen and Meckling emphasize private beneﬁts as being non-pecuniary,
Barclay and Holderness (1989) state that “private beneﬁts can be pecuniary, in-
cluding higher salaries for individual blockholders or below-market transfer prices
for corporate blockholders.” Barclay et al. (1993) further distinguish direct and
indirect pecuniary transfers. Direct transfers could be obtained, for example, by
employing relatives or close associates of the blockholder while indirect beneﬁts can
arise from using the ﬁrms’ voting power in its subsidiaries to defeat takeovers or to
implement business strategies in these subsidiaries which beneﬁt only blockholders.
Holderness and Sheehan (1988) note that most beneﬁts of control are transferable
while some by their nature are not, “in particular, an individual may value being in
control of the company he founded, a beneﬁt which obviously cannot be transferred.”
Transferable private beneﬁts are sold to new blockholders, who are willing to pay
a premium for them. Reputation beneﬁts are hardly transferable and thus lead
the blockholder to keep control in order to preserve them and engage in rent-seeking
activities. This distinction is not drawn by Dyck and Zingales (2004) who categorize
private beneﬁts as psychic value, perquisites, and dilution.
Control does not necessarily confer beneﬁts. As Dyck and Zingales (2004) point
out, it sometimes involves costs as well. “Maintaining a controlling block, for in-
stance, forces the largest shareholder to be not well diversiﬁed. As a result, it
might value the controlling block less.” The blockholder’s large fraction of cash
ﬂow rights might involve signiﬁcant risk-bearing costs and liquidity costs (Admati,
5Pﬂeiderer, and Zechner (1994), Bolton and Thadden (1998), Maug (1998)) and it
can lead to reduced liquidity and makes the market price a less informative signal
of value (Holmstr¨ om & Tirole, 1993). At the same time, a ﬁnancially distressed
company might inﬂict a loss in reputation to the controlling party or even legal
liabilities. (Dyck & Zingales, 2004). In all models examined in this paper agents
are risk-neutral individuals without wealth restrictions as in Zingales’ (1995) model.
Although most of the reasons for negative private beneﬁts thus do not apply, our
model provides general solutions for negative private beneﬁts as well.
3 Basic Model
The models developed in this paper are based on Zingales’ (1995) model which
focuses on the control issues when going public. The course of this chapter is as
follows. First, it is instructive to review Zingales’ model and outline its main contri-
butions and predictions. Second, we extent his model, so as to include uncertainty
about the buyer’s characteristics and legal constraints when selling the company.
Finally, policy implications and empirical predictions are derived.
The framework to analyze transfers of control is based on the ideas and nomen-
clature proposed by Zingales (1995) which are also present in the model by Bebchuk
and Zingales (1996).
When selling the company, an incumbent manager, I, who is also owner of the
company, has to decide which fraction of the company’s stock she oﬀers to dispersed
shareholders, S, and which fraction she retains for a subsequent sale to some rival R.
There are exactly one incumbent and one rival, while dispersed small shareholders
are atomless, that is, the market for minority shares is perfectly competitive, while
the market for controlling blocks is not. When the incumbent decides to sell a
fraction of his shares to outside shareholders, she receives the expected value of
those shares. To the contrary, if she sells a controlling block to an outside investor,
she will not be able to extract the whole surplus from this trade but will receive a
fraction of the surplus depending on her bargaining power ψ.
The incumbent’s valuation of the company consists of two components. The
veriﬁable amount vi denotes the cash ﬂow accruing to all shareholders measured
using some standard metric, i.e. it can be claimed in court. A second component
Bi consists of private beneﬁts that only the controlling shareholder receives and
which might be observable or not. The rival’s valuation is denoted by vr and Br,
respectively.
It is important to note that private beneﬁts are modelled not to be related to the
6company’s cash ﬂows. It seems reasonable to assume a negative correlation between
the extraction of private beneﬁts and the company’s bottom line results through
direct diversion of funds or distortion of the manager’s decisions, but this might
not always be the case. We follow the literature (Harris and Raviv (1988), Zingales
(1995), Bebchuk (1999) in assuming two independent variables to keep results clear
and simple. All agents have perfect information about the other agent’s types,
behave rational, and are risk neutral. There are no costs of holding a large fraction
of shares, which could be motivated either on the basis of risk-aversion costs - as
do Bebchuk (1999) and (Admati et al., 1994) - or alternatively on the basis of
liquidity costs (Bolton and Thadden (1998), Maug (1998)). In his basic model,
Zingales (1995) allows for cash ﬂow rights and voting rights to be freely combined.
This is the most general assumption possible, which leads to several interpretations
following the diﬀerent combinations of rights throughout this paper. For example,
an IPO might induce an ownership structure which places all of the voting stock in
the hands of the incumbent but only a small fraction of the cash ﬂow rights. This
can be seen as a dual-class structure, whereas all voting power and all the cash ﬂow
rights ending up with the incumbent might be interpreted as a single-class structure.
Finally, the riskless rate is assumed to be zero. Without loss of generality and in
line with the models similar to this one, the analysis is limited to those cases with
all alternative investments having zero returns.
Incumbent
decides whether to 
go public
Company









Figure 1: Sequence of events in the basic model
Zingales’ model of control sales consists of four phases as depicted in ﬁgure 1.
At time 0 the incumbent decides whether or not to go public. If she decides to go
public, she determines a fraction φ of the company she wants to retain after the IPO.
At time 1 a potential buyer, the “rival”, with a diﬀerent valuation steps in and his
characteristics (i.e. his potential to improve or reduce the company’s cash ﬂow and
his ability to extract private beneﬁts) are revealed. At time 2 the bargaining between
the incumbent and the rival takes place. If the incumbent retains a majority of votes
7at time 0, the rival can only prevail by negotiating with the incumbent. Bargaining
power is modelled by ψ, which denotes the probability that the incumbent makes
a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer which is accepted by the buyer. If the oﬀer is successful,
control is transferred to the rival. Otherwise, the negotiation game ends. If the
incumbent does not retain a majority of votes, the buyer can attempt to obtain
control by buying a majority of votes from dispersed shareholders. Zingales (1995)
shows that it never pays for the incumbent to relinquish control, since she always
could sell her cash ﬂow rights to dispersed shareholders and could additionally trade
his voting power for some positive value which is attached to the control right by
the buyer. Since the model is a ﬁnite game, it is solved by backward induction.
Time 2 The incumbent sells his stake if the valuation of her stake in the company
is less than the rival’s valuation of that fraction. This condition yields a limiting







with Bi and Bi representing the incumbent’s and rival’s private beneﬁts, vi and
vr representing the cash ﬂows with the incumbent or rival managing the company
and φ denoting the incumbent’s fraction of the company before time 2.
In Zingales’ model, φ ≥ Br−Bi














Time 1 Since it always pays for the incumbent to retain the majority of votes
(because she does not receive any consideration when selling votes to dispersed






(1 − ψ)(Bi + φvi) + ψ(Br + φvr) + (1 − φ)vr ,Bi + φvi ≤ Br + φvr
Bi + vi ,Bi + φvi > Br + φvr
(3)
with ψ referring to the bargaining power of I, which determines her share in the
proceeds.





Bi + φvi + (1 − φ)vr + ψ(Br + φvr − Bi − φvi) ,Bi + φvi ≤ Br + φvr
Bi + vi ,Bi + φvi > Br + φvr
(4)
which can be interpreted as the reservation utility claimed by the incumbent
(Bi + φvi) and her share in the surplus when selling the control block to the rival.




   
   
Bi + vi + ψ(Br + vr − Bi − vi) ,vr ≤ vi
(1 − ψ)Bi + ψBr + vr ,vr > vi,Br > Bi
Br + vr ,vr > vi,Br ≤ Bi
. (5)
With all agents having perfect information in Zingales’ model, it is possible for
I to extract the buyer’s whole private beneﬁts if these are less than those of the
incumbent1.
4 Model with Uncertainty
All conclusions and predictions derived in the basic model assume perfect informa-
tion of all agents. While many authors concerned with ownership structure (Be-
bchuk, 1999), initial public oﬀerings (Stoughton & Zechner, 1998), and the process
of divesting the company (Mello & Parsons, 1998) employ uncertainty of cash ﬂows
in their models, the following model is designed to shed some light on the con-
sequences of the rival’s private beneﬁts of control being unknown at the time of
an IPO. This introduction of symmetric uncertainty causes a selection process for
takeovers which has a potential to harm minority shareholders and as a consequence
rules out a ﬁrst best solution to the wealth distribution problem during IPOs and
subsequent control transfers. All other assumptions are held equal compared to the
basic model.
The sequence of events is shown in ﬁgure 2. At time 0 the rival appears and reveals
his characteristics, including his potential to increase cash ﬂow and his private ben-
1In a model with transaction costs charged by an investment bank, the fraction retained by the
incumbent after the IPO is always lower than in the basic model by Zingales. There is an optimum
combination of ﬁxed and variable cost an investment bank could charge in order to maximize its
revenue from fees. This fee is the diﬀerence between the buyer’s valuation of the ﬁrm and the
revenue accruing to the incumbent when selling directly to the buyer. This model is not depicted
here, but is available from the authors upon request.
9eﬁts from controlling the company. Neither small shareholders nor the incumbent
are informed about the value of the rival’s private beneﬁts but know the distribution
from which the rival is drawn. One could consider this case as facing the IPO deci-
sion without knowing which kind of rival will appear to buy the controlling block.
The incumbent decides at time 1 which fraction of the company to oﬀer to outside
shareholders and she conducts an IPO if that fraction is positive. The rival generally
is not interested in participating in the IPO if his private beneﬁts are positive and
cash ﬂow rights can be separated from voting rights, which is assumed here. In-
stead, at time 2 he enters a bargaining game with the incumbent over the remaining
fraction of the company. If the rival’s valuation of that fraction is higher than the
value attributed by the incumbent, he buys the controlling block. Otherwise, the
game ends without change of control. At the same time shareholders observe the
outcome of the bargaining game and adjust their beliefs about future cash ﬂow de-
pending on who is in control of the company at time 3. In the last phase, cash ﬂows
accruing to all shareholders are realised. The managing investor (i.e. the incumbent
or the rival) extracts his respective private beneﬁts, the company is liquidated and
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Figure 3: Decision tree for model with uncertainty
There is no need to introduce explicit secondary market phases, since all minority
10shareholders are assumed to be homogenous, which renders the allocative function
of a secondary market unnecessary. There are exactly two points in time where
prices of shares are established: ﬁrst the IPO price at time 1 and the ﬁnal value of
shares at time 2 when it becomes clear which cash ﬂow will be realised at time 3.
For convenience, one can think of there always being a market where shares in the
company could be traded after they have been oﬀered at time 1.
Relaxing the assumption of perfect information is an attempt to bridge the gap be-
tween Zingales’ (1995) model and Mello and Parsons’ (1998) informational approach,
although they focus on monitoring issues while this model places an emphasis on
private beneﬁts. This model is more realistic than Zingales’ as private beneﬁts of
potential buyers of the company are usually not known at the time the incumbent
decides whether to go public. The same is true for the rival’s cash ﬂow, but since it
seems plausible that private beneﬁts are harder to estimate than cash ﬂow and to
keep the argument simple, we assume with Zingales that the potential rival’s cash
ﬂow is known a prior. Private beneﬁts of the rival are described by the distribution
B(Br
s) with mean µ and standard deviation σ (the subscript s denoting the fact
that shareholders must make a good guess to decide which fraction of the company
to buy at the IPO and to distinguish this parameter from the true value of private
beneﬁts in the basic model Br). All information is symmetric, which should also
exclude possible signalling mechanism.
The key element in this general model with uncertain private beneﬁts is that
despite their knowledge of the distribution of the rival’s private beneﬁts, it is not
suﬃcient for minority shareholders to substitute the expected value for the known
true value in the basic model. This is because the incumbent could expropriate
minority shareholder whenever vr > vi simply by oﬀering shares at price vr as in
the basic model, which is the minority shareholder’s valuation in case of a control
transfer. If the rival’s private beneﬁts are lower than expected by shareholders,
the incumbent would not sell the controlling block to the rival, thereby extracting
(1 − φ)(vr − vi) from minority shareholders. If a public oﬀering is made, minority
shareholders do not get back any value, for the incumbent always extracts their full
utility in this case.
Whenever minority shareholders use the expected value of the rival’s private bene-
ﬁts to decide how many shares to buy and which price to pay for these, the incumbent
goes public at lower realizations of Br
s if this is beneﬁcial to him (left hand side of
B∗ in ﬁgure 4) but does not sell the controlling block to the rival. Only a successful
transfer of control would render the higher cash ﬂow vr possible, which shareholders
expect at the IPO. Therefore, shareholders experience a loss. On the right hand side





Figure 4: Sample probability density function of private beneﬁts Br
s
The expected value of the rival’s private beneﬁts (0) cannot be used by minority shareholders to
calculate maximum price and fraction to buy from the incumbent. If shareholders overestimate
private beneﬁts (left hand side of 0), they would experience a loss (Vs,o), because the incumbent
would not transfer control to some value-increasing rival. On the right hand side, shareholders
receive their residual utility (vr, upper solid line), which would leave them with an overall loss
if they do not “risk”-adjust the IPO price (dashed line) to obtain some upside potential (Vs,w),
which is done by setting the appropriate IPO price and amount of shares through optimising Bs.
of 0, the incumbent conducts an IPO and a subsequent control transfer with share-
holders netting zero proﬁts due to perfect competition in the market for dispersed
shares. Minority shareholders thus lose money (the amount of which depending on
the distribution of the rival’s private beneﬁts), which would drive them out of the
market in the long run.
There is no way of reducing informational deﬁcits among minority sharehold-
ers, since all information is assumed to be symmetric. If incumbent and minority
shareholders could sign a contract that stipulates a consideration to be paid to
shareholders conditional on the rival’s true private beneﬁts, adverse wealth eﬀect
for shareholders might be reduced. However, the nature of private beneﬁts makes
them hard to measure. Even if they can be measured, it is usually hard to claim
them in court. Therefore, we follow the literature and assume that private beneﬁts
are not contractible.
In order to keep shareholders participating in IPOs, the incumbent has to adjust
the price and fraction oﬀered so as to increase shareholder’s incentive to buy shares
at the IPO. There is an optimum for both variables at which minority shareholders
receive exactly zero proceeds from taking part in the IPO process while the incum-
bent’s payoﬀ is at a maximum. Finally, the fraction of the company sold and the
price paid are lower than those predicted by the basic model.
12For demonstration purposes, this model is ﬁrst described in general terms and
then applied to a uniform distribution of private beneﬁts. Results will be stated for
both.
Similar to the basic model, φ denotes the fraction of shares retained by I after
the IPO. At the same time it represents the threshold from which S is willing to pay
a price vs
r > vi for the higher cash ﬂow realised by R after acquiring the controlling
block. This fraction is determined by the (yet unknown) variable Bs, which is
contingent on the distribution of R’s private beneﬁts and describes the point of an











If I conducts an IPO with subsequent control sale, shareholders receive proceeds
which equal their share in the cash ﬂow realised by R less than the public oﬀering
price.




Without control sale, cash ﬂow is the same as at time 0, thus yielding




The condition to keep S in the market is vr ≥ vr
s ≥ vi , because S loses vr −vr
s in
IPOs without control transfer at time 2 and wins vr
s − vi if the rival takes over. If
cash ﬂow under the rival’s management was lower than cash ﬂow with I managing
the company, there would be no incentive for shareholders to buy shares in an IPO.









The incumbent gets her reservation utility and has to bargain over the surplus with
the rival, thus extracting a part of his private beneﬁts depending on her bargaining
power. Conducting an IPO and divesting 1 − φ to minority shareholders before
selling the controlling block yields
VIPOsale = B
i + φv








which is composed of the incumbent’s reservation utility (Bi + φvi), the revenue
gained from going public ((1 − φ)vr
s) and her share from bargaining with the rival.
If I does not sell to the rival after the public oﬀering, she receives all proceeds from
13the IPO and retains the cash ﬂow accruing to her at time 3 with respect to the
fraction of the company retained by her.
VIPOwo = B
i + φv
i + (1 − φ)v
r
s (11)
The corresponding revenue for the rival is






when conducting an outright sale of the whole company. If a share 1 − φ is sold
to minority shareholders by the incumbent ﬁrst, R gets






Finally, if the incumbent oﬀers shares to the public but does not transfer control
to R, the rival’s revenue is VR,IPOwo = 0.
4.1 Possible cases of future cash ﬂow
I vr < vi; Bi + vi ≥ Br
s + vr
The company is not sold in this case, since neither by selling directly to the
rival nor by oﬀering shares to the public the incumbent earns more than her
reservation utility Bi + vi.
II vr < vi;Bi + vi < Br
s + vr
A divestiture is only conducted by direct sale to the rival. The IPO price
always has to be higher than vi to motivate shareholders to buy a fraction of the
company but lower than vr to compensate shareholders for losing money when
no control sale takes place after the IPO. This condition is clearly violated,
thus rendering public oﬀerings impossible in this case.
III vr > vi
Public oﬀerings are possible whenever vr > vi. Therefore, this condition is
assumed in the following analysis of the divestiture model.
4.2 Determining the best method to sell
There are two generic processes to sell the company: The incumbent has to decide
between 1) a mixed method of going public and making the decision to sell the
14control block dependent on the realization of R’s private beneﬁts and 2) an outright
sale to the rival.
The sequence of events depicted in ﬁgure 2 implies that before deciding whether
to go public, the incumbent has to estimate her revenue in both cases. In the case
of an outright sale to the rival, I does nothing at time t1 and waits for the char-
acteristics of the rival to be realised at time t2 whereupon she sells her controlling
block or not. If the incumbent goes public at time t1, the realisation of R’s private
beneﬁts at time t2 determine whether I sells the controlling block or keeps her stake
in the company. To ﬁnd the best decision for I at time t1, it is obvious to compare
the expected values for both ways of divestment.
Revenue when selling the controlling block directly
The revenue when staying private is obtained by integrating equation 9 and the


















The lower bound vi + Bi − vr of this integral is due to the fact that I only sells
to R, if she gains some positive amount from trade, that is vr + Br
s > vi + Bi, and
therefore Br
s > vi + Bi − vr (see ﬁgure 5).
Revenue when going public
Integrating revenues from IPOs without control sale (VIPOwo, equation 11) and
from IPOs with such a sale (VIPOsale, equation 10) yields the overall revenue if the
generic process of going public is selected.
VIPO = B
i + φv
















After going public at time t1, the incumbent’s decision to sell depends on the
realisation of the rival’s private beneﬁts Br
s. I is indiﬀerent between a control sale
and doing nothing, whenever VIPOsale = VIPOwo.
Therefore
B


















The incumbent is better oﬀ going public and selling the controlling block thereafter
compared to going public without control sale whenever the realisation of Br
s is
greater than the parameter Bs, which determines the fraction retained (φ).
To calculate the total value for I, the respective values for public oﬀerings with
and without control sale have to be added, which represent the distribution of rev-
enues along B on the left hand side of Bs (IPO without control sale) and on the










Figure 5: Incumbent’s revenue for uncertain private beneﬁts.
Diﬀerent realisations of the rival’s private beneﬁts yield diﬀerent revenues for two generic sales
processes. IPOs with subsequent control transfer are combined with IPOs without such a sale
(solid line = VIPO). The company may also be sold directly to the rival (dashed line = VDirect),
whenever there is a positive gain from trade depending on the probability distribution of Br
s.
4.2.1 Optimizing revenue
Since minority shareholders lose money whenever there is an IPO without control
transfer while they proﬁt whenever control is transferred to the rival, there exists


















or expressed by the cumulative distribution function of B with 0 = Vs,oB(Bs) +
16Vs,w(1 − B(Bs)). This equilibrium constitutes a constraint on the optimisation of
I’s revenue.





















i)(1 − B(Bs)). (20)
It follows immediately that for B(Bs) > 0 the IPO price is less than the price
calculated by Zingales (1995) for comparable expected private beneﬁts because of
uncertain private beneﬁts and the risk of shareholders being expropriated by the
incumbent.
When substituting the constraint from equation 19 for the IPO price vr
s in equation
15 and maximizing for Bs, the optimum fraction φ is then determined by equation
6.





i + Bs − B
i)B
0(Bs) + (1 − ψ)(1 − B(Bs)). (21)
For a proof of equation 21 see Appendix B.1.
Setting the above to zero yields
1 − ψ




The maximum for VIPO with respect to Bs is implicitly deﬁned by equation 22,
whose solution depends on the distribution of private beneﬁts. The behavior of







VIPO = −∞, whereas there is no general algebraic solution for possible max-
ima or minima in between. However, if the right hand part of equation 22 (which is
a hazard function) is monotonic, there is exactly one solution to this optimisation
problem. Considering the behaviour of VIPO on the limits, this solution must be a
maximum or inﬂexion point. It can only be an inﬂexion point, however, if the ﬁrst
and second order condition are jointly zero at some Bs. It can be shown that this
is not the case for a standard normal distribution and possibly many more (see Ap-
pendix B.2). Therefore, exactly one maximum exists for the incumbent’s proceeds
from selling the company.
Using the solution of equation 22 to substitute for Bs in equations 6 and 20 ﬁnally
17yields the optimum fraction φ to be oﬀered to minority shareholders and the IPO
price vr
s.
4.2.2 Going public or not?
Suppose that the incumbent has calculated the optimum revenue in the case of going
public (equation 15). This provides her with a scenario what would happen, if she
went public. To reach a conclusion about the best strategy to sell the company,
she has to compare this value with her revenue estimate in case of an outright sale
without using public capital markets.
∆V = VIPO − VDirect (23)
= (v
r − v















Whenever this diﬀerence in revenue is positive, the incumbent goes public (for a
proof of equation 23 see Appendix B.3). Otherwise, she sells directly to the rival
(negative diﬀerence) or becomes indiﬀerent (if VIPO = VDirect). The key question is:
What are the circumstances that I pursues an IPO strategy? It appears that this is
always the case for at least a family of distributions of private beneﬁts, if the rival’s
cash ﬂow valuation is higher than the incumbent’s (vr > vi) and the incumbent
lacks absolute bargaining power (ψ < 1). It can be shown for equally distributed
private beneﬁts, that whenever vr > vi, ψ < 1 and uncertainty is greater than zero,
the incumbent goes public (Appendix B.4). Simulations suggest, that results are
the same for normally distributed private beneﬁts (Appendix C).
These results imply that it is optimal for I to go public, even if the expected value
of private beneﬁts is below some critical Br
s such that the company is less valuable
for the rival than for I (Br
s + vr < Bi + vi). This is contrary to Zingales (1995),
where only value-increasing public oﬀerings take place.
4.2.3 Revenues of minority shareholders and rival
The revenue accruing to shareholders is zero (constraint) while the rival receives a
positive cash ﬂow.
Rival’s revenue when going public













Taking into account only those cases in which the controlling block is sold, which
























In this case, the rival’s payoﬀ is the same as in Zingales’ model under perfect
information if the expected value of private beneﬁts is substituted for the known
value of the rival’s beneﬁts in the basic model.
4.3 Numerical example
While using the same ﬁgures as Zingales (1995) in his basic model, the rival’s pri-
vate beneﬁts are substituted by a normal distribution with mean 10 and standard
deviation 5 to introduce uncertainty.
vr = 140 (cash ﬂow with R managing the company)
vi = 100 (cash ﬂow with I managing the company)
Br
s ∼ N[10,25] (private beneﬁts of R)
Bi = 40 (private beneﬁts of I)
Bs = endogenous (private beneﬁts assumed by I and S to calculate φ)
vr
s = endogenous (IPO price)
φ = endogenous (fraction retained by I after the IPO)
ψ = 0.5 (bargaining power of I)
To demonstrate how the model works, two cases are drawn from the distribution
of private beneﬁts and revenues are calculated for these. First, it is assumed that
shareholders pay the value of the cash ﬂow realised under the rival’s management
(vr) when buying shares as in the basic model. Second, the impossibility of such
an outcome under uncertainty is shown. Finally, all relevant revenues, fractions and
premiums are calculated for the extended model as described above.
19Case 1: Br
s = 2 Suppose the true private beneﬁts of R are 2, although this is
not known to the agents. The fraction to be retained by I would be 0.95 in the
basic model (equation 6), but 0.75 if shareholders substitute the expected value of
private beneﬁts (10) for the unknown true value. Having no better guess than the
distribution characteristics, shareholders would be willing to buy up to 0.25 = 1−φ
shares from the incumbent. Selling directly to the rival, I would gain 141 (equation
9). However, I is better oﬀ selling 0.25 shares to S for 150 (equation 11: 150 =
40 + 0.25 · 140 + 0.75 · 100 vs. equation 10: 141 = 40 + 0.25 · 140 + 0.75 · 100 +
0.5(2−40+0.5(140−100))). Since the fraction retained by I is below the optimum
derived from the basic model now, I does not proﬁt from a sale to R anymore.
Consequently, she keeps her share in the company and waits for her cash ﬂow to be
realised at time 3.
S is surprised by I’s move, because shareholders expected some higher cash ﬂow
vr through R’s management, which is what they paid for. Instead of this higher
cash ﬂow they receive only vi (in relation to their share φ), which leaves them with
a loss of 10 (equation 8: −10 = 0.25·100−0.25·140). In this case, the incumbent’s
surplus equals the loss for minority shareholders.
Case 2: Br
s = 16 The realization of 16 is higher than the expected value of
private beneﬁts. φ would be 0.75 again, although I would sell shares unless φ = 0.6
(equation 6 with Br
s = 16), because she would still be able to sell to the rival
afterwards. When selling directly, I could gain 148 from trade (equation 9) while
she would receive 150 again if she conducted an IPO (equation 11 vs. 10). Hence, I
oﬀers 1 − φ = 0.25 shares to minority shareholders but does not sell the controlling
block to R. Shareholders are surprised again and end up with a negative return.
Summarizing all possible cases over B shows that S regularly loses money and
only gets his initial investment back in case the controlling block is sold to the ri-
val, since the IPO price would be equal to cash ﬂow under the rival’s management
then. Therefore, S does not pay vr for shares that are worth it only in the marginal
case. Consequently, some other marginal values for vr
s and φ are to be found which
maximize revenue for I but still keep S in the market.
When optimizing revenue for I with respect to Bs, which is used instead of the
unknown true value and substitutes for the expected value of private beneﬁts, the
maximizing value is Bs = 6.320 (equation 22, see ﬁgure 6). Thus, the fraction
of the company retained by I is φ = 0.842 (equation 6). Fixing shareholder’s
revenue at zero results in an IPO price of vr
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Figure 6: The incumbent’s revenue dependent on the parameter Bs
This parameter substitutes for the rival’s unknown true private beneﬁts, subject to a zero-proﬁt
constraint for minority shareholders.
incumbent gains VIPO = 147.037 from going public (equation 15), while her revenue
is VDS = 145.021 when selling directly to the rival (equation 14). Consequently, the
incumbent goes public with 0.158 shares (compared to 0.3 in the basic model) at a
price of 130.766 (140 in the basic model). With probability P = 1−B(Bs) = 0.769,
the controlling block is transferred to the rival thereafter.
I receives 147.037 and R gains 2.176 from the sale (equation 25, see ﬁgure 7).
The sum of 149.213 is below the total value for R (which is 150 on average). The
diﬀerence of 0.787 could be interpreted as a social loss due to adverse selection re-
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Figure 7: The rival’s revenue dependent on the parameter Bs
This parameter substitutes for the rival’s unknown true private beneﬁts, subject to a zero-proﬁt
constraint for minority shareholders.
215 Implications
The predictions of this model fall into four categories: First, prices for initial public
oﬀerings are used to predict the long-run share price performance, which is diﬀer-
ential for subsamples of IPOs in our model. Second, an overestimation bias can be
identiﬁed in prior measured of private beneﬁts using control premiums. Third, we
develop new insights into the paths an owner can choose to sell the company. Finally,
the optimality of takeover regimes with mandatory bids and an equal opportunity
rule is discussed.
5.1 IPO price and stock performance after an IPO
The issue whether initial public oﬀerings are priced correctly is still to be settled,
and the phenomenon of long-run share price underperformance of IPOs in general
might turn out to be caused by ﬂawed methodologies. Overpricing occurs because
investors are too optimistic about the prospects of IPOs (Ritter (1991), Loughran
and Ritter (1995)) or because investment banks use the comparable valuation ap-
proach that does not include “busted” IPOs (Lewis, Seward, and Foster-Johnson
(2000)). Another strand of literature argues in favour of eﬃcient markets and de-
scribes abnormal returns as phenomena which are randomly distributed around zero
or generated by using the wrong methodology of estimating long-term abnormal
performance (E. F. Fama (1998), Mitchell and Staﬀord (2000)). However, there is
evidence for diﬀerential performance of ﬁrms which are sold after the IPO compared
to ﬁrms whose controlling shareholder does not change during the years following
the IPO. These diﬀerences can persist even if on average IPOs are priced correctly.
Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1993) study the stock price performance of 146
spinoﬀs and their parents over three years following the spinoﬀs in 1968-1988 and
ﬁnd positive abnormal returns for spinoﬀs as well as their parents, which are at-
tributable to ﬁrms involved in subsequent takeover activity. The average adjusted
two-year return for spinoﬀ-parent combinations reaches 24.2 percent. Long-run re-
turns studied by Ehrhardt and Nowak (2003) indicate a similar pattern for dual-class
IPOs in Germany from 1970 to 1991. Underperformance for these ﬁrms of almost
minus 20 percent is paralleled by inferior operating performance, while underper-
formance for non-dual-class IPOs is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. Within
the underperforming subsample, negative abnormal returns are especially severe for
ﬁrms with the founding family still holding a supermajority ten years after the IPO.
These ﬁndings suggest that transfers of control after the IPO lead to higher post-
IPO stock performance with respect to ﬁrms whose initial owner does not sell the
22majority of votes. While Ehrhardt and Nowak explain this pattern by ex ante unan-
ticipated expropriation of minority shareholders due to poor investor protection, dif-
ferential stock performance results directly from rational behaviour of shareholders
in our model. Under uncertainty, share prices appreciate or depreciate over time as
it becomes clear whether or not there will be a transfer of control.
After conducting an IPO at time 1 and selling shares to minority shareholders at
price vr
s, the incumbent has to decide whether to sell the controlling block to the
rival. Transferring control leads to an appreciation of stock prices of (vr − vr
s)/vr
s,
since higher cash ﬂow under the rival’s management will now be achieved with
certainty. Therefore, the initial risk discount by shareholders to protect themselves
against expropriation by the incumbent is not necessary anymore. There should be
an announcement eﬀect depending on the probability of the control transfer actually
being executed. This prediction is consistent with results found by Holderness and
Sheehan (1988), who document an announcement eﬀect of 12 percent for control
transactions which exists independent from whether or not there is an additional
tender oﬀer to minority shareholders.
If corporate control is not transferred, share prices drop to vi at time 2, because
shareholders give up their hope of increasing security beneﬁts through better man-
agement. The underperformance in comparison to all IPOs is (vr
s − vi)/vr
s. If one
assumes that control transfers are less likely for dual-class ﬁrms, for example, to
protect private beneﬁts, then this is the underperformance found by Ehrhardt and
Nowak. Comparing IPOs without control sale to IPOs with subsequent control
transfers yields an underperformance of (vr − vi)/vr. Share price appreciation to
vr or depreciation to vi following announcements of control transfers results from
minority shareholders anticipating the cash ﬂow at time 3. Their reservation utility
either jumps to the value of their ownership stake (1−φ)vr or decreases to (1−φ)vi if
there is no control transfer. In contrast to the models of Grossman and Hart (1980)
as well as Holderness and Sheehan (1988) it is not necessary to assume marginal
shareholders having knowledge about being inﬂuential or negligible for the success of
transfer-of-control transactions. Control transfers happen before the rival decides to
make a tender oﬀer for shares outstanding after the transfer of the controlling block
(possible between time 2 and time 3, but not modelled here), and cash ﬂows are
independent of minority shareholders tendering or not. Therefore, the ﬁnal outcome
does not depend on possible free riding problems and shareholder behaviour during
tender oﬀers.
235.2 Overestimation bias in control sales
Control premiums can be measured using diﬀerent approaches. The one closest
to this model is the method employed by Barclay and Holderness (1989). They
study the relation between block trade price and closing exchange price on the
announcement day of the trade and ﬁnd an average premium of 20.4%.
The control premium estimated in several studies does not necessarily reﬂect
private beneﬁts, because it assumes that control transactions happen in competitive
markets where bargaining power of buyers is perfect (ψ = 1). Since this is usually not
the case, estimates of private beneﬁts by measuring control premiums are downward
biased as Nicodano and Sembenelli (2004) and Dyck and Zingales (2004) point out.
Dyck and Zingales try to remedy this bias by estimating bargaining power, which
turns out to be 0.655 under the assumption that it is the same across all countries
studied. Given diﬀerent objections to this method, they ﬁnally state that “overall,
these results give conﬁdence that the Barclay and Holderness method to estimate
private beneﬁts indeed measures private beneﬁts (and not overpayment) and it does
so introducing smaller biases than the alternative method.”
Nevertheless, this method only captures private beneﬁts in control sales. These
beneﬁts do not need to be the same for the whole range of companies. In our model,
companies on the left tail of the distribution of private beneﬁts are never sold. They
either stay private or experience some minor fraction to be oﬀered publicly without
subsequent transfer of control.
To illustrate the way in which an estimation bias can arise, ﬁrst consider the
estimation model used by Barclay and Holderness (1989) and made explicit by Dyck
and Zingales (2004). They ﬁrst derive a per-share measure of private beneﬁts, which
equals the result of the bargaining game between I and R and the value of cash ﬂows
attached to the fraction of the company which is sold minus the post-announcement
share price.
P =
Bi + φvi + ψ(Br




Multiplying this price diﬀerence by the size of the controlling block yields an
estimator for private beneﬁts.
ˆ B = φB
r
s + (1 − ψ)B
i − φ(1 − ψ)(v
r − v
i) (28)
When bargaining power is considered by including the term (1−ψ) in the equation,
ˆ B is an unbiased estimator of a weighted average of the buyer’s and seller’s private
beneﬁts. This estimation can, by its very nature, capture only those private beneﬁts
24that are revealed during a control sale. Therefore, it is unlikely to be representative
for all companies being public, if there is reason to believe that ﬁrm characteristics
are not the same for companies undergoing a control sale and those not being sold.
This might be the case, since ﬁrms self-select into the control sale sample through
higher private beneﬁts. To see this, consider the set of all ﬁrms which are up for
sale. These ﬁrms go public, whenever the rival’s cash ﬂow valuation is higher than
the incumbent’s (vr > vi). If such a ﬁrm is sold by transferring the control block
to the rival, private beneﬁts ( ˆ B) can be measured. Otherwise, private beneﬁts are
those of the incumbent (Bi), but remain unobservable. Since control is sold only
in those cases where the realisation of private beneﬁts is higher than some critical
point Bs (see ﬁgure 5), this subsample’s mean (which is measured) is upward biased
compared to the overall mean of the rival’s private beneﬁts. If this overall mean
is, for example, as high as the incumbent’s private beneﬁts Bi, private beneﬁts are
overestimated by the standard method. In fact, the rival’s mean private beneﬁts
can even be lower than Bi and still generate some bias due to the distribution’s left
tail being cut oﬀ during the sales process.
An estimation bias as described above would not have been possible in Zingales’
original model, since no selection bias is possible. All companies going public are
sold to the rival thereafter, because this is, what perfectly informed shareholders ex-
pected and paid for. In our model, however, all there is after the IPO, is a probability
distribution of a control transfer, dependent on the rival’s private beneﬁts. The re-
alisation of private beneﬁts therefore generates two subsamples of public companies,
whereof the one with high private beneﬁts is sold to the rival.
While describing the measurement of private beneﬁts when employing the block
premium method, our model also accounts for variability between this method and
estimation by measuring the price diﬀerence for share with diﬀerential voting rights
(e.g. Nenova (2003) using dual class stocks). Dyck and Zingales (2004) discuss their
ﬁndings in the light of Nenova’s prior study and ﬁnd that private beneﬁts are gen-
erally higher in the study with dual class stocks. They attribute this to the higher
probability of establishing dual class structures of ﬁrms with larger private beneﬁts.
Taken all these arguments together, we conclude that estimates of private beneﬁts
using dual class stocks should be higher than estimates by measuring control premi-
ums, which in turn should be higher than the grand mean for all listed companies.
Consequentially, due to a double selection bias, the highest private beneﬁts should
be observable for companies being sold after establishing dual class structures.
255.3 Optimal way to sell the company
Articles studying IPOs and the decision to go public mostly describe initial public
oﬀerings as reactions to ﬁnancing needs along the growth path of the ﬁrm. This
view has been called into question due to a broadening perspective of the functions
of public oﬀerings. Rydqvist and H¨ ogholm (1995) study the going public decision of
family-owned ﬁrms in Sweden and ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant fraction of shares is sold by
initial shareholders during the IPO. They explain this by the owner’s consumption
or portfolio diversiﬁcation needs. Cusatis et al. (1993) examine a sample of spinoﬀs
from 1965 to 1988, which shows a signiﬁcantly positive abnormal two-year mean
return. They attribute this abnormal return to the share price performance of ﬁrms
that were taken over subsequent to the spinoﬀ. The interesting point in studying
spinoﬀs despite their similarity to IPOs is the possibility to abstract from the funding
motive driving the spinoﬀ. They argue that spinning oﬀ subsidiaries provides a low-
cost method of transferring control of corporate assets to bidders who will create
greater value but do not want to bid for the company as a whole.
The maximization of proceeds by going public is analyzed by Zingales (1995)
within an extended merger and acquisition process. An owner-manager maximizes
proceeds from selling cash ﬂow rights by going public whereas revenue from the
sale of voting rights is maximized by bargaining directly with a potential buyer.
Therefore, the decision to go public depends on the fraction of the company which,
when being sold to dispersed shareholders, maximizes the owner-manager’s revenue.
Zingales’ model predicts that direct sales are preferable if the potential buyer is
likely to reduce the value of cash ﬂow rights. An initial public oﬀering might yield
a higher revenue if cash ﬂow under the buyer’s management is higher than the cash
ﬂow generated by the owner-manager. The fraction retained by the incumbent is
always sold to the buyer following the IPO, which is not necessarily the case in our
model. The phenomenon of an increased rate of changes of control after IPOs is
found by Rydqvist and H¨ ogholm (1995) in a study of 166 Swedish public oﬀerings
between 1970 and 1991. Owners relinquish control in 36 percent of all IPOs within
ﬁve years of listing, 48 percent retain control and 16 percent either go back private
or go bankrupt. Moreover, 90 percent of the ﬁrms studied have dual-class shares
structures implemented, a fact which is consistent with a prediction of our model
that initial owners will employ dual-class structures to retain control even if selling
the majority of cash ﬂow rights is the revenue-maximizing choice.
Ellingsen and Rydqvist (1997) argue that many ﬁrms become publicly traded
as the ﬁrst stage of a longer term divestment plan. Listing the ﬁrm on a stock
exchange generates information production by market participants which reduces
26adverse selection costs associated with sales of unlisted stock. The same argument
is put forward by Mello and Parsons (1998) who model information aggregation
by investors when demand by dispersed investors and value creating potential by
potential buyers are uncertain. They point out that an optimal strategy for going
public starts with an IPO with the ﬁnal ownership structure in mind. The marketing
of potential controlling blocks to investors should occur after the aggregate demand
has been revealed by the market. Quite the opposite is proposed by Stoughton and
Zechner (1998) who suggest ﬁrst selling shares to the large investor and then selling
to dispersed shareholders at the same per-unit average price. This order of events
does not seem to be supported by the empirical evidence. They explain underpricing
and rationing in IPOs as a second-best response to regulatory constraints to achieve
an optimal ownership structure where the blockholder incurs monitoring costs. In
our model, the new blockholder manages the ﬁrm himself and thus has no incentive
to monitor.
Finally, Reuer and Shen (2004) locate initial public oﬀerings within an extended
merger and acquisition process where ﬁrms can ameliorate ex ante transaction costs
due to search costs and information asymmetries in the M&A market. They argue
that ﬁrms may use initial public oﬀerings prior to divestiture in order to increase
the ﬁrm’s visibility to potential acquirors where information about the identity or
availability of exchange partners is incomplete. In their empirical study they ﬁnd
that sequential divestiture is more likely in industries with spatially-dispersed ﬁrms
and for ﬁrms with signiﬁcant intangible resources.
The model developed in this paper does not focus on information production
through market prices but emphasizes the importance of initial public oﬀerings in
extended divestiture processes where both the seller and buyer can extract private
beneﬁts from control.
The optimal way to sell the company is to ﬁrst go public with a minority or
non-voting fraction of the company and then to sell the voting block to some new
owner, dependent on the realisation of this owner’s private beneﬁts. An IPO is
always preferable to selling directly to some new majority shareholder, if a) this
new owner generates higher cash ﬂows than the incumbent, b) uncertainty about
his private beneﬁts exists, and c) the incumbent’s bargaining power is not perfect.
Uncertainty causes a non-zero probability that the company is sold following the
IPO, which attracts minority shareholders to share in the gains from higher cash
ﬂows and a rising ﬁrm valuation. The incumbent thus sells a corresponding fraction
of the company to dispersed shareholders, since she can extract their full utility due
to perfectly competitive markets for dispersed shares, which she could not do when
27bargaining directly with the rival.
This feature of a strict IPO policy is new to our model compared to the original
model by Zingales. The empirical observation of ﬁrms being sold privately, however,
could be accounted for by lower expected cash ﬂows under the rival or by introducing
transaction costs. If one assumes a ﬁxed cost of becoming and being listed, this cost
could easily outweigh the beneﬁts from going public. In this case, ﬁrms would chose
not to go public, because to volume of stock being listed as predicted by our model
would simply be too small to justify the expenses.
5.4 Mandatory tender oﬀers
Throughout this paper we have assumed that transfers of control are either not
regulated or they are conducted under a regime similar to the “Market Rule” (MR),
which allows controlling shareholders to sell their controlling blocks without letting
minority shareholders share in the gains (Bebchuk, 1994). In the following section,
we will relax this assumption by introducing two other regimes governing takeovers.
We will see that both produce results similar to those obtained from the model
under MR as described above.
The ﬁrst one is a simple “Mandatory Bid Rule” (MBR), which requires buyers to
make a tender oﬀer to minority shareholders whenever they acquire control of the
ﬁrm. Furthermore, they have to oﬀer a price which in some jurisdiction equals an
average share price of the respective class of shares they want to buy over some past
time period, while in other jurisdictions this price must be the highest price over
some period. Since existing literature does not deﬁne mandatory bids identically
(e.g. Bergl¨ of and Burkart (2003), Hoﬀmann-Burchardi (1999), and Bebchuk (1994)),
the terms “mandatory bid” and “mandatory bid rule” shall refer only to those kinds
of mandatory tender oﬀers which entitle minority shareholders to a fair consideration
measured by an average share price.
The second regime, labelled the “Equal Opportunity Rule” (EOR), entitles non-
controlling shareholders to participate in or otherwise beneﬁt from control transac-
tions, usually by being paid the same per-share price as the seller in a mandatory
tender oﬀer. This regulation has been implemented, for example, by the European
Parliament and Council Directive 2004/25/EC of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids.
The bidder’s oﬀer to minority shareholders shall be “the highest price paid for the
same securities by the oﬀerer, or by persons acting in concert with him, over a period
[..] of not less than six months and not more than twelve before the bid.” This rule
eﬀectively forces the bidder to pay the same per-share price for minority shares as
for the controlling block.
28Basic model with mandatory bid and perfect information
If the rival has to make a tender oﬀer to minority shareholders, the optimal way
to divest the company diﬀers from the one resulting from the basic model with
perfect information. Taking all the assumptions from the basic model and adding a
mandatory bid rule yields a combination of share price and number of shares oﬀered
to dispersed shareholders, which allows the incumbent to extract the rival’s whole
surplus. Since the rival is required to make a tender oﬀer to minority shareholders
at some past average share price, his decision to take over the company depends
on the outcome of the following tender oﬀer. The mandatory tender oﬀer always
coincides with the rival acquiring the controlling block, which is why the incumbent
sells to the rival whenever
B
i + φv





r + (1 − φ)v
r.
Introducing mandatory bids adds a new term to the inequality, which is the
amount the rival has to pay minority shareholders for their stake. R has to acquire
the minority shareholders’ stake (1−φ) at an average share price, which could diﬀer
from the IPO price but will be the same, for the incumbent will set the IPO price
to extract the whole minority shareholders’ surplus. The rival values this stake at
(1 − φ)vr. Corporate control is thus transferred if Bi + φvi + (1 − φ)vr













s > Br − Bi + vr, these are all possible combinations of IPO price and
fraction retained by the incumbent, which maximize the incumbent’s revenue by
extracting the rival’s surplus completely. Dispersed shareholders are even willing to
pay prices above expected cash ﬂow vr, since they can be sure that there will be a
mandatory oﬀer to get their money back. This result is true for both single-class
and dual-class share structures, for the price paid by the rival will always be the
past average price regardless of the shares being voting or non-voting ones.
Model with mandatory bid and uncertainty
The incumbent’s ability to extract the rival’s total utility disappears, if uncertainty
of private beneﬁts is introduced. For each realisation of private beneﬁts Br
s the
29optimal fraction retained by the incumbent after the IPO would be
φ ≥
Br








Facing a tender oﬀer, minority shareholders have to decide whether to tender their
shares. Declining the rival’s oﬀer yields Vs = (1 − φ)vr − (1 − φ)vr
s, for they can
wait for vr to be realised with certainty. Because the average share price oﬀered by
the rival to dispersed shareholders is the IPO price, tendering their shares results
in a proﬁt of zero. One can also rule out the possibility that shareholders tender
for less than vr, for they can free ride on the rival’s improvements simply by doing
nothing (Grossman & Hart, 1980). Theoretically, the incumbent could demand a
higher initial public oﬀering price vr
s than in a model without mandatory bids (and
even higher than vr) to reduce the surplus to bargain for with the rival. The trade
surplus for R would be zero if Bi + φvi + (1 − φ)vr
s = Br
s + vr, thus enabling I to
extract the rival’s surplus completely by selling ﬁrst to dispersed shareholders and
transferring control thereafter as in the basic model with perfect information.
Setting the IPO price above the rival’s cash ﬂow valuation vr in order to extract
his utility is not feasible with uncertain private beneﬁts. If the incumbent sets
some IPO price vr
s higher than vr and the realisation of private beneﬁts satisﬁes the
condition for a control transfer, minority shareholders’ proﬁt would be zero, since
the rival oﬀers some average price which is the IPO price. If private beneﬁts turn
out too small to trigger a control sale, the incumbent’s cash ﬂow will be realised,
leaving shareholders with a loss of (1 − φ)(vr
s − vi). This is essentially the same
mechanism as in our general model with uncertainty.
To compensate minority shareholders for losses they incur if I does not sell the
controlling block, the initial public oﬀering price could be chosen such that the
diﬀerence between IPO price and the maximum price possible (v∗ − vr
s) sets oﬀ all
these losses. However, this option is not feasible for I, if the market for dispersed
shares is perfectly competitive. Shareholders would have to bid up the share price
from vr
s to v∗, leaving the last buyers with a loss in the moment the rival makes
an oﬀer, because being the ones paying the highest price, they would always have
bid more than the average price. Therefore, there is no incentive for individual
shareholders to bid up the price.
The maximum IPO price is thus vr
s = vr, which eliminates the possibility of using
the mandatory bid rule to extract the rival’s utility. This IPO price, substituted for
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vi − vr ,
which is exactly the same as in our general model. The ability of mandatory bids
with an average price rule to help the incumbent is limited to the special case of
perfect information and cannot be generalised to a model with uncertainty.
Equal opportunity rule
In the following extension of the model with uncertainty, we will assume that when-
ever the rival acquires a controlling block, minority shareholders receive the same
per-share price. The rival bids for the controlling block whenever his valuation of
the whole company is higher than the incumbent’s reservation utility and the price
for outstanding dispersed shares, i. e. Bi + φvi + (1 − φ)p ≤ Br
s + φvr + (1 − φ)vr,








i − (1 − φ)p), (29)
which is the incumbent’s reservation utility and her share in the surplus divided




is the per-share price paid for the controlling block. Solving for p yields
p =
Bi + φvi + ψ(Br
s + vr − Bi − φvi)
φ + ψ − φψ
(30)
Substituting equation 30 into the condition that the incumbent’s reservation util-
ity and the consideration paid to minority shareholders are less than or equal to the
rival’s valuation of the whole company (i.e. Bi + φvi + (1 − φ)p ≤ Br




s + vr − vi. (31)
This is the result obtained by Zingales, while he employs a diﬀerent argumen-
tation. He argues that the rival will end up paying (Bi + φvi)/φ = Bi/φ + vi for
the whole company. If cash ﬂow rights can be separated from control rights, the
incumbent can always retain a suﬃciently small fraction of cash ﬂow rights attached
to the majority of votes such that Bi/φ+vi = Br
s+vr, which is the same as equation
31.





The price paid by the rival to acquire the whole company following a mandatory
bid under an equal opportunity rule is exactly his reservation utility. Therefore, the
incumbent can extract this full utility, if the rival’s private beneﬁts are known.
With uncertain private beneﬁts, however, results change to some extent to allow
I to extract more of the rival’s surplus. The key diﬀerence between EOR and MR
is that dispersed shareholders receive the rival’s cash ﬂow valuation vr under MR,
but participate in the control sale between incumbent and rival at some higher price
p under EOR. Therefore, the maximisation constraint that dispersed shareholders
net a zero return (equation 18) has solutions for higher IPO price and/or number
of shares oﬀered. If a control sale occurs, shareholders earn











which is depicted in ﬁgure 8. As in the general model, the optimal number of
shares to sell (φ) results from choosing a revenue-maximising Bs in φ = Bi/(Bs −
vi + vr). In contrast to the general model, dispersed shareholders earn p instead of
the rival’s cash ﬂow vr, while p is now dependent on the optimisation parameter Bs






(Bs − vi + vr)ψ
Bi(1 − ψ) + (Bs − vi + vr)ψ
,
which is positive, since 0 ≤ φ = Bi/(Bs−vi+vr) ≤ 1 must be true for the fraction
sold.
Compared to the general model, adding an equal opportunity rule leads to higher
revenues for the incumbent because she can utilize competitive markets for dispersed
shares to a greater extent to extract the rival’s surplus without bargaining. It is
important to notice that there is no diﬀerence between the two takeover regimes
for minority shareholders by deﬁnition, since the incumbent anticipates all wealth
eﬀects for shareholders and rival when deciding about IPO price and volume.
Under an EOR, public oﬀerings can be conducted at a price higher than the rival’s
cash ﬂow valuation, and up to p = Br
s +vr. Because the IPO price is not limited by
the rival’s cash ﬂow vr, the EOR even facilitates IPOs (and takeovers) where cash
ﬂow drops after the control sale. If cash ﬂow under the rival is lower than under the
incumbent (vr < vi), but R’s expected private beneﬁts Br
s are suﬃciently high, the









Figure 8: Sample probability density with EOR for ﬁxed Bs
Dispersed shareholders gain more from control sales under EOR, since their revenue is now de-
pendent on the transaction price p between incumbent and rival. This allows for higher IPO price
(vr
s) and/or fraction sold to dispersed shareholders (through Bs).
IPO price can still be attractive for minority shareholders, since p ≥ Br
s + vr ≥ vi.
This anticipation of a higher price in control sales is crucial for overall wealth
eﬀects and considerations regarding the superiority of EOR or MR. In the general
model with EOR, it is hard to derive general solutions for all cases possible. But
there are indications that the superiority of each regime depends on the empirical
distribution of private beneﬁts. For some distributions the probability of a control
transfer is higher for EOR, while for others the reverse is true. For instance, consider
the standard numerical example as described in section 4.3. The probability of a
control sale is 1 − B(Bs) where B(Bs) is the value of the cumulative probability
distribution at point Bs. For a distribution with mean µ = 10 and standard devi-
ation σ = 5, Bs = 6.320 for MR whereas Bs = 6.289 for EOR, implying a higher
chance of the rival taking over under EOR. In a case where σ = 15, Bs = 9.602 for
MR and Bs = 9.680 for EOR. This higher chance of a control transfer in the ﬁrst
case corresponds to greater social utility under EOR, since in order to establish a
ﬁrst best optimum, all realizations of private beneﬁts Br
s greater than zero should
be followed by a control transfer in our example (because then Br
s + vr > Bi + vi),
while only those with Br
s > Bs actually are. We conclude that from a theoretical
ex ante point of view it is not clear whether EOR facilitates transfers of control.
Empirical research is needed to shed some more light on this matter, especially when
theoretical predictions suggest only slight diﬀerences in eﬃciency.
336 Summary and conclusions
The decision to go public is an important step in the life cycle of the ﬁrm, which
has been widely studied under diﬀerent perspectives such as funding needs, portfolio
aspects or management motivation issues. This paper focuses on the role of initial
public oﬀerings as an instrument to divest the company within an extended mergers
and acquisitions context. The initial owner’s valuation of the ﬁrm is assumed to con-
sist of two parts: security beneﬁts accruing to all shareholders and private beneﬁts
of control, which can only be extracted by an owner who holds a majority of votes in
the ﬁrm. Zingales (1995) suggests that ﬁrms use two-stage sales to maximize total
proceeds by relying on the capital market to auction oﬀ cash ﬂow rights and the
market for corporate control to negotiate the sale of the private beneﬁts of control.
This paper extends the basic model by Zingales in several directions.
The main contribution of this paper is to introduce uncertainty of the buyer’s
private beneﬁts of control in the basic model. Relaxing the assumption that agents
have perfect information about the other agents’ types yields qualitatively new pre-
dictions.
Because dispersed shareholders only have knowledge about the distribution of the
rival’s private beneﬁts, they must base their decision of how many shares to buy
and which price to pay on estimates of these private beneﬁts. If the shareholders’
estimate is too high, the incumbent sells more shares to minority shareholders as
would be possible if a subsequent control sale to the rival was to be conducted. The
incumbent thus retains control and a possibly higher cash ﬂow is not realized by the
rival, which leaves shareholders with a loss. To compensate them for these losses
on the left tail of the distribution of private beneﬁts, the incumbent prices shares
lower than she would under perfect information. As a consequence, the incumbent
retains a larger fraction of the company.
This uncertainty about future security beneﬁts which come with uncertain private
beneﬁts at the time of an IPO yields another interesting feature of our model.
Conditional on the rival realizing suﬃciently high private beneﬁts and thus acquiring
the controlling block, share prices increase when control sales are announced or
decrease as the probability of a control transfer reaches zero. This explains the
post-IPO underperformance of stocks which are not subject to control transfers
compared to ﬁrms that are taken over subsequent to their initial public oﬀering.
Empirical predictions for control premiums and the size of private beneﬁts can
be derived from our model. An estimate for control premiums in block trades
using post-announcement share prices similar to the one employed by Barclay and
Holderness (1989) and Dyck and Zingales (2004) identiﬁes a new overestimation
34bias in prior estimates. This bias results from the fact that the sample of ﬁrms
that get measured stems from a selection process which favours ﬁrms with high
private beneﬁts. Companies with low private beneﬁts sometimes go public but are
not taken over. If these ﬁrms with low private beneﬁts were included, estimates for
overall control premiums should be lower.
In line with existing literature, the importance of initial public oﬀerings within a
divestiture plan is conﬁrmed. What’s new is that with uncertain private beneﬁts,
the decision to list is independent from private beneﬁts. This paves the way for
IPOs even if on average the ﬁrm would be less valuable under some rival taking over
subsequent to the IPO. The optimal way to sell the company is to ﬁrst go public with
a minority or non-voting fraction of the company and then to sell the voting block
to some new owner, dependent on the realisation of this owner’s private beneﬁts.
An IPO is always preferable to selling directly to some new majority shareholder,
if this new owner is expected to generate higher cash ﬂows than the incumbent
and the incumbent’s bargaining power is not perfect. Because in some cases realised
private beneﬁts will be large enough to make a sale viable, uncertainty causes a non-
zero probability that the company is sold following an IPO, which attracts minority
shareholders to share in the gains from higher cash ﬂows and a more valuable ﬁrm.
The incumbent thus sells a corresponding fraction of the company to dispersed
shareholders, since she can extract their full utility due to perfectly competitive
markets for dispersed shares, which she could not do when bargaining directly with
the rival.
Finally, the assumption of unregulated takeovers or control transfers according
to the “Market Rule” (MR) is relaxed. Mandatory bids which require the buyer
to make tender oﬀer to dispersed shareholders do not change the outcome of our
model. Mandatory bids with an additional equal opportunity rule (EOR), which
forces the buyer to pay dispersed shareholders the same per-share price as for the
controlling block, change the distribution of proﬁts among incumbent, rival, and dis-
persed shareholders, but do not alter the mechanism of our model. This model can,
however, provide some insights into when and how superiority of MR or EOR can be
established. We identify cases in which the distribution of private beneﬁts alone –
and speciﬁcally its standard deviation – causes social superiority of one regime or the
other. Diﬀerences between the two rules are small and the reason might be found
in the anticipation of possible wealth eﬀects by the incumbent when setting IPO
price and volume. These ex ante considerations have not been studied before in this
extended framework with an IPO decision and subsequent control sale. Empirical
research into this question under a life cycle perspective of the ﬁrm is clearly needed.
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38A Summary of Notation
Table 1: Summary of Notation
Symbol Explanation
Br Private beneﬁts accruing to the rival (R)
Bi Private beneﬁts accruing to the incumbent (I)
vr Cash ﬂow with R managing the company
vi Cash ﬂow with I managing the company
vr
s Initial public oﬀering price
φ Fraction retained by I after the IPO
ψ Bargaining power of I
Bs Private beneﬁts parameter assumed by I and shareholders (S)
to calculate φ
B(Br
s) Distribution of the rival’s private beneﬁts
B0(Br
s) Probability Density Function of the rival’s private beneﬁts
VDS Revenue accruing to I for individual realizations of Br
s
VDirect Revenue accruing to I over the whole distribution of Br
s
VIPO Revenue accruing to I in case of an IPO over the whole
distribution of Br
s
VIPOsale Revenue accruing to I after an IPO if control is transferred to R
VIPOwo Revenue accruing to I after an IPO if control is not transferred to R
Vs,w Revenue accruing to S if control is transferred to R
Vs,o Revenue accruing to S if control is not transferred to R
VR,DS Revenue accruing to R if the ﬁrm is sold directly to R
VR,IPOsale Revenue accruing to R if the ﬁrm is sold to R after going public
VR,Direct Revenue accruing to R if the ﬁrm is sold directly to R over
the whole distribution of Br
s
VR,IPO Revenue accruing to R in case of an IPO over the whole
distribution of Br
s
P Control premium (premium paid for controlling blocks)
39B Proofs
B.1 Proof of ﬁrst order condition









































































and substitute the constraint on vr
s from equation 19
VIPO = B
i + φv















































































































i + Bs − B
i)B
0(Bs) + (1 − ψ)(1 − B(Bs)),
which completes the proof.
40B.2 Proof of revenue maximum
The ﬁrst order condition is
1 − ψ








= (ψ − 2)B
0(Bs) + (B




and for Bs being an inﬂexion point
ψ − 2





























Since ψ lies between 0 and 1 by deﬁnition, the function of Bs on the right hand side
of this equation has no joint solution with the – only numerically solvable – hazard
function on the left, which establishes that there is no inﬂexion point at Bs.
41B.3 Proof of equation 23
To ﬁnd ∆V = VIPO −VDirect, we ﬁrst substitute vr
s from equation 20 in equation 15
and expand the integral into two components by addends to get
VIPO = B
i + v

























Splitting the integral range in equation 14 to match the one above and subtracting
gives
VIPO − VDirect = (1 − φ)(v
r − v
















































Cancelling out corresponding terms and integrating where it is possible yields
VIPO − VDirect = (1 − φ)(v
r − v



















∆V = VIPO − VDirect = (v
r − v















which completes the proof.
42B.4 Proof of IPO superior to direct sale
To show that ∆V = VIPO − VDirect is positive for all cases in which vr > vi and
uncertainty of private beneﬁts is not zero, we evaluate the ﬁrst order condition from
equation 22 for uniformly distributed privated beneﬁts and use the result in this
equation.
Assume that Br
s is uniformly distributed between parameters a and b, such that
B0(Bs) = 1
b−a = p and B(Bs) = pBs.
It follows from equation 22, that
Bs =
p(vr − vi − Bi) + ψ − 1
p(ψ − 2)
.




in the revenue diﬀerence when going public vs outright sale (equation 23)
∆V = (v
r − v

















(p(Bi + vi − vr) − 1)2(ψ − 1)2
p(ψ − 2)2 − ψ
(p(Bi + vi − vr) − 1)2(ψ − 1)2
2p(ψ − 2)2
= −
(p(Bi + vi − vr) − 1)2(ψ − 1)2
2p(ψ − 2)
.
























































Figure 10: Fraction of the company
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Figure 13: Going public vs direct sale
Diﬀerence between proceeds for going public (VIPO) and for selling directly to the rival (VDirect)
for standard normally distributed private beneﬁts. Parameters vr − vi and ψ represent the diﬀer-
ence in cash ﬂow valuation unter the rival and incumbent and the incumbent’s bargaining power,
respectively. Incumbent’s private beneﬁts Bi have been ﬁxed at 5, while other values for Bi show
similar results.
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